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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-871
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BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION, et al., PETI-
TIONERS v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, etc., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the first circuit
[January 12, 1993]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Respondent Ernest C. Brown, a former employee of
petitioner Bath Iron Works Corp., learned after he retired
that he suffered from a work-related hearing loss.  The
parties agree that under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat.
1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. 901 et seq., respondent
is entitled to disability benefits on account of his injury.
They disagree, however, as to the proper method of
calculating those benefits.
  There are essentially three -systems- for compensating
partially disabled workers under the Act, two of which are
at issue in this case.  The -first- system provides for
compensation for partially disabled claimants who have
suffered certain statutorily -scheduled- injuries, one of
which is hearing loss.  The -third- system provides for
compensation for retirees who suffer from occupational
diseases that do not become disabling until after retire-
ment.  In most, but not all, cases, benefits for scheduled
injuries are more generous than those provided retirees
suffering from latent occupational diseases.  The question
presented in this case is whether a claimant who discov-
ers, after retirement, that he suffers from a work-related
hearing loss should be compensated under the first
system, because loss of hearing is a scheduled injury, or
under the third system, because he did not become aware
of the disabling condition until after retirement.

                            I
  Prior to 1984, the LHWCA provided that compensation
for a permanent partial disability should be determined
in one of two ways.  If the injury was of a kind specifi-
cally identified in the schedule set forth in 8(c) of the
Act, 33 U. S. C. 908(c)(1)-(20) (1982 ed.) the injured
employee was entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly
wage at the time of the injury for a specific number of
weeks, regardless of whether his earning capacity had
actually been impaired.  See Potomac Electric Power Co.
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449
U. S. 268, 269-270 (1980).  Loss of hearing was among
those specified injuries.  In all other cases, the Act
authorized compensation equal to two-thirds of the differ-
ence between the employee's average weekly wage and his
postinjury earning capacity.  33 U. S. C. 908(c)(21).  In
those cases, unlike the scheduled-injury cases in which
disability was presumed, it was necessary for the em-
ployee to prove that his injury had actually decreased his
earning capacity.
  In early 1984, the Benefits Review Board was con-
fronted with a case in which the claimant had contracted
asbestosis, a latent occupational disease that did not
manifest itself until after his retirement.  Because the
disease did not qualify as a scheduled benefit, the claim-
ant was not entitled to a presumption of disability;
moreover, because it did not affect his actual earnings, he
could not establish -disability- as defined in 902(10).
Therefore, the Board held, the claimant was not entitled
to any compensation under the Act.  Aduddell v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass, 16 BRBS 131, 134 (1984).  Three
weeks after the Aduddell decision, the Board followed its
reasoning in a case involving a hearing loss claim filed
after the claimant's retirement.  Redick v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 16 BRBS 155 (1984).  Although the ALJ in Redick
had made a finding of disability because -scheduled
awards are conclusive presumptions of loss of wage-
earning capacity and cannot be rebutted,- id., at 156, the
Board vacated the award of benefits, reasoning that the
-voluntary retirement was prior to manifestation of the
injury, and was unrelated to his hearing loss.-  Id., at
157.
  In 1984, Congress amended the Act by adding the
-third- compensation system that unquestionably provides
compensation for the type of claim rejected in Aduddell
and the other asbestos cases.  With the 1984 Amend-
ments, Congress authorized the payment of benefits to
retirees suffering from occupational diseases that become
manifest only after retirement.  More precisely, a new
10(i) addresses claims for death or disability -due to an
occupational disease which does not immediately result in
death or disability.-  33 U. S. C. 910(i).
  As is the case under the first two compensation systems,
compensation under the third system turns in large part
on the -average weekly wage- used to calculate benefits.
When the -time of injury--defined as -the date on which
the employee or claimant becomes aware, or . . . should
have been aware, of the relationship between the employ-
ment, the disease, and the death or disability,- ibid.-is
within the first year of retirement, the claimant's average
weekly wage is based upon the claimant's wages just prior
to retirement.  910(d)(2)(A).  When the -time of injury-
is more than one year after retirement, the average
weekly wage is deemed to be the national average weekly
wage at that time.  910(d)(2)(B).
  Once the -average weekly wage- is determined, a
claimant's benefits are calculated under 8 of the Act.
For claims in which -the average weekly wages are deter-
mined under section 910(d)(2),- that is, for retirees with
claims involving -an occupational disease which does not
immediately result in death or disability,- 33 U. S. C.
910(i), a new 8(c)(23) provides that compensation shall
be two-thirds of the applicable average weekly wage
multiplied by the percentage of permanent impairment as
determined by particular medical guides specified in the
statute.  33 U. S. C. 908(c)(23).  The claimant is entitled
to such benefits for the duration of the impairment. Ibid.
  The differences between the first and third compensation
systems can result in significantly differing benefits.  An
award to a claimant under the schedule, i. e., the first
system, is based upon the degree of loss to the scheduled
body part, whereas an award under the third system is
based on the extent to which the -whole body- has been
impaired.  In most cases, this difference makes recovery
under the schedule more generous than that under the
retiree provisions.
                           II
  Respondent was exposed to loud noise during his
employment as a riveter and chipper at petitioner's iron
works from 1939 until 1947, and again from 1950 until
his retirement in 1972.  In 1985 he received the results
of an audiogram indicating an 82.4 percent loss of hear-
ing.  As authorized by a provision in the 1984 Amend-
ments that is not at issue in this case, he then filed
a timely claim for benefits.
   The ALJ, following Board precedent, applied a hybrid
of the first and third compensation systems to calculate
respondent's benefits.  The ALJ concluded that
respondent's hearing loss fell within the scope of the 1984
amendments as an occupational disease that does not
immediately result in disability and that the relevant
-time of injury- was the date in September 1985 when
respondent received his audiogram and became aware of
his hearing loss.  Accordingly, the ALJ identified the
national average weekly wage in September 1985 as the
relevant average weekly wage.  At that point, however,
the ALJ departed from the third system; instead of
applying the formula in 8(c)(23) applicable to claims for
latent occupational diseases, he turned to the first system,
the schedule in 8(c)(13), to calculate respondent's weekly
benefit.  Respondent's benefits were thus limited to a
precise number of weeks, as opposed to continuing
throughout the duration of his disability as would be
required under 8(c)(23).  Yet, because of the differing
formulas used in 8(c)(23) and 8(c)(13), the amount of
each weekly benefit was higher than it would have been
had respondent's benefit been calculated under Section
8(c)(23).  The Benefits Review Board affirmed on the
same rationale.
   On appeal, petitioners (the employer and its insurance
carrier) agreed with the ALJ and the Board that respon-
dent suffers from a latent occupational disease within the
meaning of 10(i), but argued that the ALJ and the Board
erred in failing to apply the benefit formula in 8(c)(23)
appropriate to such claims.  While petitioners challenged
the method of computing the benefit, they did not contest
the use of 82.4% as the measure of Brown's hearing loss,
even though the record contains persuasive evidence that
a portion of that loss is attributable to the aging process
after his retirement.
   The Director of the Department of Labor's Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs challenged the ALJ's
and the Board's reasoning on different grounds.  The error
they made, the Director argued, was in looking to the
third compensation system at all, for hearing loss is not
an occupational disease that -does not immediately result
in death or disability.-  33 U. S. C. 910(i).  Relying on
undisputed scientific evidence, the Director argued that
work-related hearing loss, unlike a disease such as
asbestosis, does cause immediate disability:
-[D]eafness is an injury that a worker typically suffers
before retirement.  After retirement a worker's
workplace-noise-induced deafness will not ordinarily
grow worse; if anything it will get better.  See R.T.
Sataloff & J. Sataloff, Occupational Hearing Loss 357
(1987).  Moreover, unlike asbestosis, the symptoms of
deafness occur simultaneously with the `disease.'  In
other words, to say that a worker is `84.4% deaf' is
to say that he has lost 84.4% of his hearing.  If he
does not notice his deafness, and does not file a claim
until long after retirement, that fact does not mean
he is not deaf; it does not mean he has no deafness
symptom; rather, it means he may have grown accus-
tomed to his deafness, which is quite a different
matter.-  942 F. 2d 811, 816 (CA1 1991) (summarizing
Director's argument).

   Accepting the Director's undisputed characterization of
occupational hearing loss, the Court of Appeals held that
respondent's disability was not -due to an occupational
disease which does not immediately result in . . . dis-
ability,- 33  U. S. C. 910(i), and that therefore his claim
did not fall within the third compensation system.
-[U]sing ordinary English,- the court noted, -one would
normally say that deafness is a disease that causes its
symptoms, namely loss of hearing, simultaneously with its
occurrence.  One simply cannot say that a person suffering
from deafness is not deaf-whether or not he notices how
deaf he is.-  Id., at 817 (emphasis added).  Having ruled
out application of the third compensation system, the
court found that respondent's claim fell squarely within
the first system, which draws no distinction between
retired and working claimants and expressly provides for
compensation for work-related hearing loss.  The Court
thus affirmed the Board's result-application of the benefit
calculation formula for scheduled injuries in 8(c)(13)-but
rejected its reliance on the third compensation system for
latent occupational diseases.
   The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion.  While both
courts have agreed with the court below in rejecting the
Board's -hybrid- approach, they have both held, in con-
trast to the decision below, that a retiree's claim for
occupational hearing loss is -a claim for compensation for
. . . disability due to an occupational disease which does
not immediately result in . . . disability,- 33 U. S. C.
910(i), and therefore should be compensated under the
retiree provisions enacted in 1984.  See Ingalls Shipbuild-
ing v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
898 F. 2d 1088 (CA5 1990); Alabama Dry Dock and Ship-
building Corp. v. Sowell, 933 F. 2d 1561 (CA11 1991).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.  503 U. S.
____ (1992).  We now affirm.

                           III
  Petitioners do not dispute the Director's or the lower
court's characterization of occupational hearing loss, and
we find no basis for doing so ourselves.  Once we accept
that characterization, it follows that the retiree provisions
enacted in 1984-the so-called -third- compensation sys-
tem-do not apply to claims for occupational hearing loss.
Occupational hearing loss, unlike a long-latency disease
such as asbestosis, is not an occupational disease that
does not -immediately result in . . . disability.-  33
U. S. C. 910(i).  Whereas a worker who has been
exposed to harmful levels of asbestos suffers no injury
until the disease manifests itself years later, a worker
who is exposed to excessive noise suffers the injury of loss
of hearing, which, as a scheduled injury, is presumptively
disabling, simultaneously with that exposure.  Because
occupational hearing loss does result in immediate dis-
ability, the plain language of 10(i) leads to the conclusion
that a retiree's claim for occupational hearing loss does
not fall within the class of claims covered by the third
compensation system.
   The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits recognized the crucial distinction between occupa-
tional hearing loss and latent diseases such as asbestosis,
but nonetheless concluded that Congress, in enacting the
third compensation system, did not intend to distinguish
between the different types of occupational diseases
suffered by retirees.  In particular, these courts were
concerned that if a retiree's claim for occupational hearing
loss was not deemed to be a claim with respect to -an
occupational disease which does not immediately result in
. . . disability,- then the Act would be silent as to the
appropriate -time of injury- for such a claim.  That is, if
the -time of injury- for a retiree's claim of occupational
hearing loss is not -the date on which the employee or
claimant becomes aware, or . . . should have been aware,
of the relationship between the employment, the disease,
and the death or disability,- then when is it?  To the
Director's response that in the case of occupational hear-
ing loss the time of injury is the date on which the
disabling condition is complete, that is, the date of last
exposure to the workplace noise, both courts found that
the -date of last exposure- rule had been rejected by other
courts and by Congress and therefore should not be
resurrected absent some indication of congressional intent
to do so.  Ingalls, 898 F. 2d, at 1093-1094; Sowell, 933
F. 2d, at 1566-1567.
   We do not find the reasoning of these courts persuasive
for two reasons.  First, the statute provides that the
retiree provisions apply not to every occupational disease,
but just to an occupational disease -which does not
immediately result in . . . disability.- 33  U. S. C. 910(i)
(emphasis added).  Asbestosis is such a disease; hearing
loss is not.  In ignoring the fact that occupational hearing
loss does immediately result in disability, the Courts of
Appeals for the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have essen-
tially read that key phrase out of the statute.  Congress
certainly could have enacted a compensation system that
treated retirees differently from current workers in all
cases, regardless of the nature of the particular occupa-
tional disease from which they suffered.  As we read the
statute, however, that is not the path Congress took.
  Second, while it is true that prior to the 1984 amend-
ments some courts had rejected fixing the time of injury,
and thus the applicable average weekly wage, as the date
of last exposure to the harmful substance, those cases
involved long-latency diseases such as asbestosis.  See,
e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Black, 717 F. 2d 1280 (CA9
1983).  In such cases, using the date of last exposure as
the relevant time of injury was deemed inappropriate
because, according to ordinary understanding, a worker is
not injured at that time; the injury arises years later
when the disease manifests itself.  Id., at 1290 (-The
average person . . . would not consider himself `injured'
merely because the [asbestos] fibers were embedded in his
lung-).  For the reasons explained above, the same cannot
be said about occupational hearing loss.  The injury, loss
of hearing, occurs simultaneously with the exposure to
excessive noise.  Moreover, the injury is complete when
the exposure ceases.  Under those circumstances, we think
it quite proper to say that the date of last exposure-the
date upon which the injury is complete-is the relevant
time of injury for calculating a retiree's benefits for
occupational hearing loss.
   Nor are we persuaded by petitioners' arguments as to
why retiree claims for occupational hearing loss should be
compensated pursuant to the third compensation system.
Petitioners correctly point out that even though the
portion of a retiree's hearing loss that is attributable to
his occupation may remain constant after retirement, the
aging process may cause it to worsen during retirement.
In our view, however, this is a matter that is relevant to
the computation of the amount of the benefit-a matter
that is not in dispute in this case-rather than to the
retiree's eligibility for a scheduled benefit.  To the extent
there is any unfairness in the statutory scheme in that
employers may be liable for hearing loss attributable to
aging, employers can protect themselves by providing their
employees with an audiogram at the time of retirement
and thereby freezing the amount of compensable hearing
loss attributable to the claimant's employment.
   Petitioners also point out, again correctly, that during
debate on the 1984 Amendments a Senator made a
passing reference to the Redick case and suggested that
the House and Senate conferees disagreed with the
Board's decision in that case.  130 Cong. Rec. 26300
(1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  Because that was a
hearing loss case, they infer that the retiree provisions of
the amendment should be construed to apply to such
cases.  In addition to the fact that the conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the premise, we reject the argu-
ment for two reasons, each of which is sufficient.  First,
when carefully read, we find the text of the statute
unambiguous on the point at issue; accordingly, we give
no weight to a single reference by a single Senator during
floor debate in the Senate.  Second, as part of the 1984
Amendments, Congress amended 8(c)(13) to preserve the
timeliness of hearing loss claims filed more than a year
after the employee's last exposure.  It accomplished
that purpose not by postponing the time of injury until
the date of awareness, but, on the contrary, by providing
that the -time for filing a . . . claim for compensation . . .
shall not begin to run in connection with any claim for
loss of hearing under this section . . . until the employee
has received an audiogram . . . .-  33 U. S. C. 908(c)
(13)(D).  Thus, Congress responded to its concern about
latent diseases that are not scheduled and cause no loss
of earnings by enacting the interrelated provisions consti-
tuting the -third- compensation system, whereas it re-
sponded to a concern about hearing loss claims by amend-
ing 8(c)(13).
                           IV
  For the reasons given, we hold, as did the court below,
that claims for hearing loss, whether filed by current
workers or retirees, are claims for a scheduled injury
and must be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(13) of the
LHWCA, not 8(c)(23).
   The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is
affirmed.
                                      It is so ordered.